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MONA FLOY WILLSON, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT 
OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Arrest-Making Arrest.-Where petitioner is shown to have 
been taken into custody While engaged in the commission of 
an offense, there is evidence that the requirements of Pen. 
Code, §§ 835, 841, relating to the maDDer of making an arrest, 
were met. 
[2] ld.-Making Arrest.-Where it may be inferred from the fact 
that petitioner was arrested in a public bar, but made no 
outcry or objection, that she realized that the arresting 
officer was a police officer whose purpose was to make an 
arrest, it is immaterial that petitioner was not expressly in-
formed of the officer's authority and purpose. 
[3] Searches and Seizures-Time of Making.-If before a search 
and seizure the officer was justified in making an arrest, it is 
immaterial that the search and seizure preceded rather than 
followed the arrest. 
[4] Arrest-Without Warrant-Reasonable Oause.-.A.lthough in-
formation provided by an anonymous informer is relevant on 
the issue of reasonable cause for making an arrest, in the 
absence of some pressing emergency an arrest may not be 
based solely on such information, and evidence must be pre-
sented to the court that would justify the conclusion that 
reliance on the information was reasonable. 
[5] ld. - Without Warrant - Reasonable Oause: Searebes and 
Seizures-Justification for.-Although the fact that a police 
officer found petitioner in a bar near a telephone standing 
by a scratch pad and a pencil with slips of paper in her hand 
and petitioner, when the officer asked to see what was in her 
hand, attempted to conceal and dispose of it, would not COD-
stitute reasonable cause to believe she was committing a 
felony, such conduct was sufficient to justify the officer's re-
liance on information previously given her of petitioner's 
bookmaking, and nnder these circumstances the evidence be-
fore the magistrate was sufficient to justify the conclusion that 
a violation of Pen. Code, § 337a, had been committed, that 
[1] See Oal.Jur., Arrest, § 21 et seq.; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 65 et seq. 
[3] See Oal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
MeR. Dig. References: [1, 2] Arrest, § 13; (3] Searches and 
Seizures, § 1; (4) Arrest, § 12; (5) Arrest, § 12; Searches and 
Seizures, § L 
) 
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the omcer haa reasonable cause before the search ana seiznre 
to believe that defendant was guilty thereof, and that the 
search, seizure and arrest were lawful. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of San Diego County from proceeding further in prose-
cution of a criminal ease. Writ denied. 
Edgar B. Hervey and James Edgar Hervey for Appellant. 
James Don Keller, District Attorney (San Diego), and 
Luther L. Leeger, Deputy Dist.rict Attorney, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By information petitioner Mona Willson 
was charged with one count of occupying premises for the 
purpose of horse-race bookmaking and one count of record-
ing a bet on a horse race. (Pen. Code, § 337a, subds. 2. 4.) 
Her motion to set aside the information on the ground 
that there is no reasonable or probable cause to believe she 
committed the offenses charged was denied (see Pen. Code. 
§ 995), and she now seeks prohibition to prevent further pro-
ceedings against her. (See Pen. Code, § 999a.) 
Petitioner contends that her commitment was based en-
tirely on incompetent evidence and that the peremptory writ 
should therefore issue. (See Rogers v. Superior Court, ante. 
pp. 3, 6, 7 [291 P.2d 929].) 
At the preliminary hearing, San Diego Chief of Police 
Adam Jansen testified that on May 25th or 26th, 1955, a man 
stopped him in the hallway of the police station. The man 
appeared to know Chief Jansen, but Chief Jansen did not 
know him and did not find out who he was or where he lived. 
The man told him that "there was a considerably large book 
making operation in progress in the Monte Carlo bar .... 
He said he had been in the place; that he had observed it, 
and he described what the operation was." Part of the in-
formation given concerned a waitress named Mona. The 
man said that she would· generally be found near the tele-
phone, that she occasionally answered it, and that she took 
bets from customers in the place. "He said that the girl 
Mona used food checks, restaurant checks. I gathered it was 
the customary tab that the waitress would make out when you 
were served food from the way he dpscribed it. She wrote 
the wagers on these slip!';. and that she had two pockets in 
her--he didn't say uniform, he said she had two pockets, 
one, I don't know which one, one contained money and thp 
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otber one contained betting slips .••. " Chief Jansen also 
testified that he later secured other information indicating 
that bookmaking activities were going 011 at the Monte Carlo 
bar, but the record does not indicate what the source of this 
information was. 
The substance of the information stated above was com-
municated to other police officers including Officer Marilyn 
Sunday, who, in the company of three other officers, went 
to the Monte Carlo bar during the afternoon of June 10th. 
The purpose of the visit was to secure evidence of bookmaking, 
and if such evidence was found, to make arrests. On enter-
ing the bar, Officer Sunday observed petitioner standing at 
the far end of the bar. She was wearing a belt with a metal 
plate that had the name "Mona" written on it. Officer Sun-
day testified that "She was standing facing the bar, and J 
approached her at that point. When I came up to [peti-
tioner), I observed on the bar a telephone, a small scratch 
pad and a pencil. I stated to her-I noticed first that she 
had something in her hand, appeared to be papers. I asked 
her if I may see what was in her hand. And as I said that, 
these papers that were in her hand, she attempted to crumple 
them, and extended her hand to the back and to the side of 
her. " Officer Sunday took the papers from her hand and 
then searched petitioner's pockets. Three slips of paper were 
taken from petitioner's hand and another from her left 
pocket, and approximately $270 in cash was found in her 
other pocket. Officer Sunday then asked petitioner to come 
with her, and she and another officer took petitioner to the 
police station. The officers were not in uniform and did not 
identify themselves as such or inform petitioner expressly 
that she was being arrested, and they did not have a search 
warrant or a warrant for petitioner's arrest. There was evi-
dence that the slips were registered bets on horses running 
in races on the day that they were seized. 
Section 835 of the Penal Code provides that "An arrest 
is made by an actual restraint of the person of the defendant, 
or by his submission to the custody of an officer. The de-
fendant must not be subjected to any more restraint than 
is necessary for his arrest and detention." Section 841 pro-
vides that "The person making the arrest must inform the 
person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, of the 
cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it, except 
when the person to be arrested is actually engaged in the 
commission of or an attempt to commit an offense, or is 
) 
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pursued immediately after its commission, or after an escape." 
[1] Since petitioner was taken into custody while apparently 
engaged in the commission of an offense, there is evidrnce 
that the requirements of these sections were met. [2] More-
over, since petitioner was arrested in a public bar, but made 
no outcry or objection, it may be inferred that she realized 
that Officer Sunday was a police ofncer and that her purpose 
was to make an arrest. Under these circumstances, it is 
immaterial that petitioner was not expressly informed of 
Officer Sunday's authority and purpose. (See People v. 
Martin,45 Cal.2d 755,762-763 [290 P.2d 855], and cases cited.) 
[3] Furthermore, if before the search and seizure, Officer 
Sunday was justified in making an arrest, it is also immaterial 
that the search and seizure preceded rather than followed 
the arrest. (People v. Simon, 45 Cal.2d 645, 648-649 [290 
P.2d 531].) 
Defendant contends, however, that before the search and 
the arrest, Officer Sunday had no reasonable cause to believe 
she had committed or was committing a felony (Pen. Code, 
§ 836, subd. 3) and that the search and seizure were there-
fore unlawful. (See People v. Brown, 45 Cal.2d 640, 642-645 
[290 P.2d 528] ; People v. Simon, supra, 45 Cal.2d 645, 647-
648; People v. Boyles, 45 CaI.2d 652, 655 [290 P.2d 535].) 
In People v. Boyles, 45 Ca1.2d 652, 656 [290 P.2d 535], 
we held that "reasonable cause to justify an arrest may con-
sist of information obtained from others and is not limited 
to evidence that would be admissible at the trial on the issue 
of guilt." Accordingly, the question presented is whether 
the information given by the unidentified man to the chief 
of police and passed on to Officer Sunday was sufficient in 
the light of the other evidence to constitute reasonable cause 
to believe that defendant was guilty of a felony. [4] Although 
information provided by an anonymous informer is relevant 
on the issue of reasonable cause, in the absence of some press-
ing emergency (see People v. K,,7,vington, 104 Cal. 86, 92-93 
[37 P. 799, 43 Am.St.Rep. 73]), an arrest may not be based 
solely on such information. (United States v. Kind, 87 F.2d 
315, 316; United States v. Blick, 45 F.2d 627, 629; United 
States v. Keown, 19 F.Supp. 639, 646; State v. Arregui, 44 
Idaho 43 [254 P. 788, 793-794, 52 A.L.R. 463] ; Hill v. State, 
151 Miss. 518 [118 So. 539, 540J; Smitk v. State, 169 
Tenn. 633 [90 S.W.2d 523, 524]), and evidence must be 
presented to the court that would justify the conclusion 
that reliance on the information was reasonable. (See People 
) 
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V. Boyle" BUpra, 45 Cal.2d 652, 656 [290 P.2~ 585].) In 
some cases the identity of, or past experience with, the in-
former may provide such evidence (see Aitken v. Wkite, 93 
Cal.App.2d 134, 145 [208 P.2d 788] ),. and in others it may 
be supplied by similar information from other sources or 
by the personal observations of the police. In the present 
ease the identity of the informer was unknown, the San' Diego 
police had had no previous experience with him indicating 
that his information was reliable, and the source and character 
of the other information with respect to bookmaking at the 
Monte Carlo bar was not sufficiently revealed to permit its 
evaluation. We must consider, therefore, whether the evidence 
observed by Officer Sunday in the bar before the search was 
sufficient to justify her reliance on the information that she 
had received. 
[5] Petitioner was found in the bar near the telephone 
where the informer had stated she would generally be. Since 
such innocent conduct could be known, however, to anyone 
who frequented the bar, it is doubtful whether its verification 
alone would justify reasonable reliance on the additional in-
formation charging petitioner with bookmaking. In addition, 
however, Officer Sunday observed petitioner standing by a 
scratch pad and a pencil with slips of paper in her hand. 
Contrary to Chief Jansen's assumption, the pad was not a 
pad of ordinary printed checks given to customers, but was 
a pad of plain scratch paper, and although such a pad would 
be commonplace equipment in.an office (see People v. Bander" 
ante, p. 247 [294 P.2d 10]), it is not ordinarily part of 
the equipment of a bar. Moreover, when Officer Sunday asked 
to see what was in petitioner's hand, she attempted to conceal 
and dispose of it. Although petitioner's conduct observed 
by Officer Sunday in the bar would not of itself constitute 
reasonable cause to believe she was committing a felony, it 
was sufficient to justify Officer Sunday's reliance on the in-
formation given her of petitioner's bookmaking. Under these 
circumstances the evidence before the magistrate was sufficient 
to justify the conclusion that a violation of Penal Code, sec-
-Binee in the present ease Chief Jansen did Dot know the identit» of 
the informer, DO que~tion is presented as to wben, if ever, a claim of 
privilege not to reveal the identity of an informer may defeat the rigbt 
to rely on bis information in making an arrest or leareb. (Bee Scher v. 
U"ited State., B05 U.B. 251, 253·254 [59 B.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151]; 
United State. v. One 1941 Oldsmobile Sedan, 158 F.2d 818, 820; Hill v. 
State, aupra, 151 Miss. 518 (118 So. 539, 540]; Smith v. State, aupra, 
169 Tenn. 6BB [90 B.W.Sd 523, 524].) 
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tion 337a, had been committed, that Officer Sunday had ~a-
80nable cause before the search and seizure to believe that 
petitioner was guilty thereof, and that therefore the search, 
seizure, and arrest were lawful. (See Husty v. United States, 
282 U.S. 694, 701 [51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 
1407]; United States v. One 1941 Oldsmobile Sedan. 158 
F.2d 818, 820; Wisniewski v. United States, 47 F.2d 825. S~6; 
Hawthorne v. State, 110 Tex.Crim. 646 [10 S.W.2d 724, 'j~5J.) 
The alternative writ of prohibition is discharged and the 
peremptory writ is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in People 
v. Martin, Crim. 5758, ante, p. 106 [293 P.2d 52), I am of 
the opinion that the search and seizure in the case at bar 
was unreasonable and therefore illegal and that the evidence 
obtained thereby was inadmissible. Since the evidence so 
obtained was the only evidence which tended to support the 
charge against petitioner, it should follow that there was 
no reasonable or probable cause to believe that she had com-
mitted the offenses charged in the information and a writ 
of prohibition should issue to prevent further proceedings 
against her. 
